Under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy O¤set Act (CDSOA) of 2000, the U.S. government distributes the revenue from anti-dumping and countervailing duties to domestic …rms alleging harm. In this paper, we develop a simple model to examine the economic e¤ect of the CDSOA. For the case in which the "o¤set payments" to domestic …rms are linked to the volume of foreign imports, the CDSOA may increase foreign imports when the domestic market is more competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium. This …nding runs contrary to what the E.U. and some exporting countries have claimed. But if the market is less competitive than in Cournot, the CDSOA becomes an instrument of trade protectionism.
Introduction
On October 28, 2000, U.S. Congress passed a trade bill called the Continued Dumping and Subsidy O¤set Act (CDSOA). 1 Under the Act, the U.S. government distributes the revenue from anti-dumping and anti-subsidies duties to domestic …rms alleging harm. These …rms use the CDSOA "o¤set payments" to cover investment activities (e.g., in manufacturing facilities and acquisition of new technology) for the production of the commodity subject to the anti-dumping and anti-subsidies measures. The enactment of the CDSOA has marked a profound policy change to the traditional U.S.
anti-dumping law under which anti-dumping and anti-subsidies duties were revenues to the U.S. Treasury. 2 In response to the Continued Dumping and Subsidy O¤set Act, the E.U. and ten other countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Thailand) requested the World Trade Organization (WTO) to establish a dispute settlement panel to examine the CDSOA. One concern is that the CDSOA o¤ers dual protection for U.S. domestic producers in dumping and subsidization from overseas. This concern is naturally related to the WTO-consistency of the Act.
Another concern is that the CDSOA may prompt U.S. domestic producers to increase the …ling of anti-dumping petitions for the purpose of receiving the o¤set payments. On the U.S. side, the U.S. government contends that dumping or subsidization is not the trigger for application of the CDSOA. Rather, the CDSOA provides for the distribution of money ("triggered" by an applicant's quali…cation as an "a¤ected domestic producer") from the U.S. government to domestic producers. The argument for the CDSOA essentially goes as follows. Dumped or subsidized imports cause material injury to U.S. …rms and workers even after the imposition of an anti-dumping or a countervailing duty order. All anti-dumping or countervailing duties should therefore be returned to injured U.S. …rms and their workers. The purpose is to restore domestic supply and employment by using the CDSOA o¤set payments for productivity improvements and worker bene…ts. However, the E.U. and other supporting countries urge the U.S. to repeal the CDSOA because the law is WTO-inconsistent.
It appears that little or no research has been done in the economic literature to systematically examine the di¤erences between the Continued Dumping and Subsidy O¤set Act and the traditional anti-dumping policy. Would o¤set payments paid to the domestic …rms under the CDSOA necessarily lower foreign imports compared to the case when the anti-dumping proceeds are government revenue? How would the CDSOA a¤ect domestic production, total consumption, and market price? How would the CDSOA o¤set payments a¤ect the optimal level of the anti-dumping tari¤?
Speci…cally, would the home country government have an incentive to raise the antidumping tari¤ under the new Act if the objective of the government is to maximize social welfare? Answers to these questions would have implications for the change in trade policy, on the one hand, and may shed light on the heated debates concerning the WTO-inconsistency of the CDSOA, on the other.
In this paper, we present a simple theoretical model to examine the e¤ect of the CDSOA under imperfect competition. We wish to analyze how the CDSOA a¤ects domestic production and consumption, foreign imports, and the domestic government's decision in adjusting its optimal anti-dumping tari¤ under the new law. In the analysis, we use the outcomes of the traditional anti-dumping policy as a benchmark to evaluate the CDSOA. In comparing the two alternative trade regimes, we pay special attention to the degree of competition between home and foreign …rms in the domestic market. We use a conjectural variations approach to capture the degree of competitiveness of market conduct. We …nd that for the case in which the o¤set payments are linked to the volume of foreign imports, the CDSOA may increase foreign imports when the domestic market is more competitive than the Cournot competition. This …nding runs contrary to what the E.U. and some exporting countries have claimed. But if the markets are less competitive than in Cournot, the CDSOA becomes an e¤ective instrument for further restricting imports.
The economic explanations are as follows. In our model, the assumption that the import-competing industry is more competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium is equivalent to assuming that home …rms hold the conjecture that if they increase their output, foreign …rms will respond by reducing their own output. 3 A reduction in foreign …rms' output implies less anti-dumping revenues for home …rms. Thus, under this conjecture by home …rms, a policy shift to CDSOA reduces home …rms' marginal bene…t of production, which results in lower domestic production in equilibrium. However, in order to maximize pro…ts, foreign …rms' actual response to lower domestic production is to increase their own production for the U.S. market (more U.S. imports). In addition, since the policy shift under this conjecture by home …rms causes price to increase, from a welfare perspective, the government has an incentive to lower the tari¤ rate. A fall in the tari¤ rate causes further increase in imports and reduction in domestic production. In summary, under this scenario of a relatively competitive domestic market, the shift in policy to the CDSOA may instead increase foreign imports.
For the case in which the import-competing industry is less competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium, our analysis shows that a policy shift to the CDSOA causes home …rms' output to increase, while lowering foreign …rms' output. On the margin, the home government has an incentive to raise tari¤ revenues by increasing the tari¤ rate. An increase in the tari¤ rate will cause a further decrease in foreign …rms' output, while causing further increases in home …rms' output. In other words, when the industry is less competitive than in Cournot, distributing the tari¤ revenue to home …rms will itself lead to less imports. Furthermore, it creates an incentive for government to raise the tari¤ rate which would further restrict foreign imports. In this case, the CDSOA o¤ers dual protection for U.S. domestic producers in dumping and subsidization from overseas, a result consistent with the argument by the E.U. and some other exporting countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model to examine the economic e¤ect of the CDSOA. The key feature of the model is its ‡exibility to mimic any equilibrium ranging from the perfectly competitive equilibrium to the fully collusive cartel equilibrium. This is an important feature of our model because, in section 3 where we analyze e¤ects of the Act on the market, we show that the e¤ects depend crucially on the degree of competition between …rms.
Concluding remarks are made in section 4.
The Analytical Framework
The model consists of a total of n …rms competing in the U.S. domestic market of a homogeneous commodity, where n 1 of them are local (or home) and n 2 are foreign …rms. We assume that …rms play a simultaneous quantity setting game, but unlike the standard Cournot model, we allow for di¤erent modes of …rms' conduct.
Similar to Dixit(1988) , we parameterize …rms' conduct so that the model allows for alternative market equilibria that range from the perfectly competitive equilibrium to the fully collusive cartel equilibrium. In what follows, we show the role that …rms' conduct plays in in ‡uencing the e¤ects of the domestic government's trade policy.
Let q 1i and q 2j represent the production levels of a home, respective foreign, …rm that are destined for the U.S. domestic market. Since we assume that foreign …rms are located in their own countries, then q 2j represents the amount of exports by each foreign …rm to the U.S. market. The inverse market demand for the commodity in the U.S. is represented by P = ® ¡ (Q 1 + Q 2 ), where
We assume that all home …rms have identical constant marginal cost c 1 . Likewise, each foreign …rm has identical constant marginal cost of production c f , but they each receive a per unit export subsidy s from their government. In response to the export subsidy that foreign …rms receive, the U.S. government imposes an anti-dumping tari¤ of t per unit of the good imported. Therefore, the e¤ective marginal cost that foreign …rms face in producing and exporting the commodity to the U.S. is c 2 + t, where c 2 = c f ¡ s. Since anti-dumping tari¤s are justi…ed under the circumstance that the subsidies received by foreign …rms are su¢cient to give them an unfair cost advantage vis a vis home …rms, we assume that c 1 > c 2 . 4 We set up the model under two regimes. Under regime 1 (the Traditional AntiDumping Policy), the government keeps all the proceeds from the anti-dumping tari¤, while under regime 2 (the CDSOA) the government distributes the proceeds to home …rms. As such, under regime 1, each of the n 1 home …rms solves the following problem,
while each of the n 2 foreign …rms solves the following problem,
Under regime 2, the problem that a home …rm must solve is,
while each foreign …rm's problem in regime 2 is identical to its problem in regime 1. Note that equation (3) implicitly assumes that the anti-dumping tari¤ revenue is distributed evenly across home …rms. One concern with the CDSOA is that the law may prompt the U.S. domestic …rms to increase the …ling of anti-dumping petitions for the distribution of the tari¤ revenue. We thus examine the "worst case scenario" in which home …rms under the CDSOA all …le petitions for the distribution and share the revenue. In other words, each home …rm is considered as an "a¤ected domestic producer" under regime 2.
Market Analysis
In this section, we …rst characterize the Nash equilibrium under both regimes and then evaluate how …rms' strategic choices change across regimes. Proofs for lemma, corollary, remark, and propositions, are located in the appendix. To facilitate ease of distinction between variables across regimes, we adopt the notation convention that variables with a hat belong to regime 1, while variables with a tilde belong to regime 2. For example, b Q 1 ; b Q 2 ; and b P, are all associated with regime 1, while e Q 1 ; e Q 2 ; and e P, are associated with regime 2.
First, we characterize the Nash equilibrium in regime 1. Given the symmetry among home …rms and the symmetry among foreign …rms, in a symmetric Nash equilibrium, the respective …rst-order conditions for a home and foreign …rm can be expressed respectively as
where v = where, 0 2 (v; v). Therefore, the Cournot model is a special case of our model. This leads us to lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Suppose c 1 = c 2 + t, and we are only considering interior solutions.
, then the market equilibrium is perfectly competitive. When v = v = 1, the model yields the fully collusive cartel equilibrium, while it yields the Cournot equilibrium when v = 0.
Based on lemma 1, the degree of competition between …rms is indexed by v, where the industry becomes more competitive the closer v is to v. This leads us to corollary 1.
Corollary 1 For any v 2 (0; v], the market equilibrium is less competitive than the Cournot equilibrium, while for any v 2 [v; 0) ; the market equilibrium is more competitive than the Cournot equilibrium.
Since symmetry in the model implies that b
and (5) can be re-written as
where
. This leads us to remark 1.
We can express the system of linear …rst-order conditions in matrix form as
The following Nash production levels are obtained by solving the matrix system for
Industry output and market price under regime 1 are
In the case of equation (12), we have substituted c 2 with c f ¡ s. This substitution reveals that an increase in foreign export subsidy lowers the U.S. domestic price of the commodity. Conversely, an increase in the U.S. anti-dumping tari¤ increases the price of the commodity in the U.S..
Let us now characterize the Nash equilibrium in regime 2, where the government distributes the anti-dumping revenue to home …rms under the CDSOA. By exploiting the symmetry within each group of …rms (home and foreign), and using the same algebraic manipulations we performed for regime 1, the respective …rst-order conditions for a home and foreign …rm can be expressed as
We can also express the system of linear …rst-order conditions in matrix form as
The Nash equilibrium production levels are
Industry output and price are
In the case of equation (19), we have substituted c 2 with c f ¡ s. Just as in regime 1, it is also the case in regime 2 that market price falls with an increase in foreign export subsidy, but increases with an increase in anti-dumping tari¤.
Having derived closed-form solutions for price and output levels across both policy regimes, we can now evaluate how a shift in regime a¤ects equilibrium price and output levels. Recall that the model yields the Cournot equilibrium when v = 0 (see lemma 1). As such, the …rst proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 1 For any given t such that t 2 (0; 1), if v = 0, then e
, and e P = b P.
The …nding in proposition 1 implies that, other things being equal, a policy shift from regime 1 to regime 2 will not a¤ect domestic production, foreign imports, total consumption, and market price if the import-competing industry is characterized by a Cournot equilibrium. In other words, given the tari¤ rate, the two trade regimes are equivalent under Cournot competition. We will use this case as a reference base to evaluate outcomes under alternative modes of market conduct.
Recall that corollary 1 describes how the value of v relates to the degree of competition among …rms. The e¤ects of a shift in policy regime for other modes of competition are summarized in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Suppose there is a shift in policy from regime 1 to regime 2. For any given t and v such that t 2 (0; 1) and v 2 (0; v], we have e
e Q > b Q, and e P < b P . Conversely, for any given t and v such that t 2 (0;
The second sentence in proposition 2 implies that whenever the industry is less competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium, if the government decides to distribute the anti-dumping tari¤ revenue to home …rms rather than keep it (shift from regime 1 to 2), then home …rms' output will increase, foreign …rms' output will fall, industry output will increase, and market price will fall. It may not seem surprising that home …rms will produce more if they receive this revenue from government. In fact, since industry output also increases, the model predicts that the increase in home …rms' output outweighs the fall in foreign …rms output(fall in U.S. imports). As such, consumers bene…t from lower prices. However, proposition 2 further states that, if the industry is more competitive than in the Cournot model, then such a shift in policy regime would cause home …rms to reduce output, and foreign …rms to increase output (increase in U.S. imports). On net, industry output falls causing price to increase. The model predictions in the case where the industry is more competitive than in the Cournot model seems surprising.
What explains the contrasting equilibrium outcomes from such a policy regime shift? Assuming the industry is less competitive than in a Cournot equilibrium is equivalent to assuming that v is strictly positive. If we compare …rst-order conditions of the home …rms across regimes (equations (6) and (13) Conversely, assuming the industry is more competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium is equivalent to assuming that v is strictly negative. In this case, a comparison of the home …rms' …rst-order conditions across regimes (equations (6) and (13)) reveals that a shift in policy regime reduces these …rms' marginal bene…t of increasing their output. Home …rms respond by reducing their output in order to satisfy their …rst-order condition in regime 2. In order to maximize pro…ts, foreign …rms respond to home …rms' output reduction by increasing their own output. Again, we see that the shift in policy regime a¤ects the home …rms directly, but the foreign …rms indirectly.
However, the arguments above raise the following question: What is the economic intuition behind the relationship between v and the marginal bene…t of an increase in home …rms' output? This can be explained using the conjectural variations approach of interpreting …rms' interactions. The idea is that v captures home …rms' conjecture about how foreign …rms will respond to a change in home …rms' output. For example, when v is positive, home …rms conjecture that if they increase their output, foreign …rms will follow and increase their output also. Since the tari¤ revenue that home …rms receive in regime 2 increases with an increase in foreign …rms output, then home …rms' marginal bene…t from increasing their output is greater under the conjecture that foreign …rms will follow by increasing their own output. The exact opposite occurs when home …rms hold the conjecture that foreign …rms will reduce their output in response to an increase in home …rms' output, that is, when v is negative.
Endogenous Anti-dumping Tari¤
Thus far, we have assumed that the per unit anti-dumping tari¤ is exogenous to the model. However, the government has its reasons for imposing the tari¤ and therefore it is likely that the level of the tari¤ is chosen to maximize the government's objective.
As such, it may be useful to incorporate the government's choice behavior into our model, which e¤ectively endogenizes the level of the tari¤. With this modi…cation, we allow for the possibility that the optimal anti-dumping tari¤ may di¤er across policy regimes.
Following the literature on strategic trade policy, we employ a sequential move game, where government moves …rst by setting the tari¤. Given the chosen level of the tari¤ in the …rst stage of the game, …rms (home and foreign) simultaneously choose quantities to maximize their pro…ts in the second stage of the game. As such, the second stage of this new two-stage game is identical to the initial model outlined above. Given the functional form of our inverse demand curve, consumer surplus is computed by
However, we assume that government's objective is to maximize social welfare, where the social welfare function is
Consistent with our notation convention used in the initial model, in this new game, we use a hat and a tilde to distinguish variables belonging to di¤erent regimes.
For example, in what follows, b S; c W, and b t belong to regime 1, while e t belongs to regime 2.
As is standard in the game theory and strategic trade policy literature, we use backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, (t; Q 1 ; Q 2 ), in the sequential game. Consistent with backward induction, we solve the …rms' quantity setting subgame …rst, and then solve for the government's optimal tari¤ in the …rst stage of the game. We …rst consider the game under regime 1, where the government keeps the tari¤ revenue, and then we consider regime 2, where the tari¤ revenue is distributed to home …rms.
Under regime 1, the equilibrium outputs and price conditional on the level of the tari¤ is given by
which are identical to equations (9), (10), and (12). Using equations (22), (23), and (24), we can rewrite equations (20) and (21) as
The only endogenous variable in equation (26) is b t. Therefore, in the …rst stage of the game, the government uses equation (26) to solve the following problem
The solution for the optimal tari¤ under regime 1 is
Let the numerator of equation (28) be denoted by A, and the denominator by B:
By an analogous process used to derive equation (22) through (28) under regime 1, we can show that the optimal tari¤ under regime 2 is
This leads to proposition 3. 5 See appendix for more detail on the derivation of optimal tari¤s.
(ii) But if the following conditions are satis…ed:
, then e t ¤ < b t ¤ when v 2 [v; 0), and e t ¤ > b t ¤ when v 2 (0; v].
Proposition 3 (i) implies that the optimal tari¤ is identical for the two alternative trade regimes under Cournot competition. This …nding is not surprising given that domestic production, foreign imports, and even market price remain unchanged for a shift in policy from regime 1 to regime. 2. Proposition 3 (ii) essentially says that if the number of home …rms and the gap between home and foreign …rms' marginal costs are not "too small," then the optimal tari¤ under regime 2 is greater than under regime 1 when the industry is less competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium, but the optimal tari¤ under regime 2 is lower than under regime 1 when the industry is more competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium.
To see the full implications of proposition 3, …rst consider the two-stage game under regime 1. In this two-stage game, the government would have set tari¤ rate b t ¤ , then home and foreign …rms' produce b Q 1 and b Q 2 respectively. Assuming the tari¤ remains …xed at level b t ¤ , and that the industry is less competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium (v > 0), if the home government distributes the tari¤ revenue to home …rms, then proposition 2 tells us that home …rms output will increase and foreign …rms' output will fall. However, since under regime 2 the old tari¤ level of b t ¤ is no longer optimal from the home country's welfare perspective, proposition 3 tells us that the government has an incentive to increase the tari¤ rate to e t ¤ . An increase in the tari¤ rate will cause further increases in home …rms' output, and a further decrease (less imports) in foreign …rms' output [see equations (16) and (17)]. Thus, in the case where the industry is less competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium, the distribution of the anti-dumping revenue to home …rms itself reduces imports, but even more important, it creates incentives for an increase in the tari¤ rate which would further restrict imports.
However, consider the other case where we start from the two-stage game equi-librium under regime 1, but instead the industry is more competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium(v < 0). Starting from this initial equilibrium, and assuming that the tari¤ rate remains …xed, if the government distributes the tari¤ revenue to home …rms, then proposition 2 tells us that home …rms' output will fall, and foreign …rms' output will increase. Under this scenario, we know based on proposition 3, that the home government now has an incentive to lower the tari¤ rate. A fall in the tari¤ rate will cause further decreases in the home …rms' output, while causing further increases in the foreign …rms' output. In other words, when the industry is more competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium, distributing the tari¤ revenue to home …rms will itself lead to more imports, but more important, it creates the incentive for government to reduce the tari¤ rate which would further loosen restrictions on imports.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a simple, stylized model to examine the Continued Dumping and Subsidy O¤set Act of 2000 under which U.S. government distributes the anti-dumping and anti-subsidies duties to the domestic …rms alleging harm. We …nd that the degree of competitiveness of market conduct plays a key role in determining the e¤ects of the new law on domestic production, foreign imports, market price, and the incentive to change the tari¤ rate.
Does the CDSOA necessarily provide dual protection to the U.S. producers and further restrict foreign imports? In the case where the import-competing industry is less competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium, the CDSOA itself reduces imports, but even more important, it creates incentives for an increase in the tari¤ rate which would further restrict imports. Thus, the CDSOA is WTO-inconsistent. Nevertheless, when the industry is more competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium, the CDSOA itself leads to more imports, but more important, it creates the incentive for government to reduce the tari¤ rate which would further loosen restrictions on imports. The predicted results when the industry is more competitive than in the Cournot equilibrium are contrary to what the E.U. and some exporting countries have claimed.
The WTO's dispute settlement panel ruled that the CDSOA is WTO-inconsistent because the o¤set payments are linked to dumping or a subsidy. 6 It is not clear whether or not this ruling was based on the premise that the anti-dumping tari¤ is …xed or that the U.S. government does not adjust its optimal tari¤ in response to the policy shift to the CDSOA. Nor is it clear whether the WTO in making its decision took into account the degree of competitiveness of …rms' conduct in the U.S. market.
Even for Cournot competition, an assumption frequently adopted in the literature on strategic trade policy, we …nd that the CDSOA and the traditional anti-dumping policy are fundamentally equivalent in terms of e¤ects on foreign imports and optimal tari¤ protection. Our analysis further shows that any question about whether the CDSOA is another layer of trade protectionism ultimately has to be answered by an empirical test of the degree of competition among …rms in the import-competing industry.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1.
We prove each claim in lemma 1 in the following order: (i) the equilibrium is perfectly competitive when v = 
Given that c 1 = c 2 + t, both equations are symmetric and we only need to consider one equation since in the perfectly competitive equilibrium, b
we can rewrite the …rst order condition as
Thus, in equilibrium we have all n …rms participating and charging a price b P = c 1 . This is a perfectly competitive equilibrium.
(ii) To establish that the model yields the cartel equilibrium when v = 1; we only need to show that the resulting …rst order condition, when v = 1; is identical to that under cartel.
In a cartel, …rms would jointly solve the following problem
The …rst-order condition from this cartel optimization problem is ® ¡ 2 b Q ¡ c 1 = 0 Now consider the case when v = 1 in our model. In this case, we can write the …rst-order condition as
Q ¡ c 1 = 0 Note that the resulting …rst-order condition is identical to the cartel's …rst-order condition.
(iii) Analogous to (ii) above, we can establish that the model yields the Cournot equilibrium when v = 0; by showing that the resulting …rst-order conditions, when v = 0; are identical to those under Cournot.
In a Cournot model, where both sets of …rms solve the following problems
the respective …rst-order conditions are
Note that the …rst-order conditions given by equations (30) and (31) are identical to the Cournot …rst-order conditions when v = 0.
(iv) Consider equation (32), which is the resulting …rst-order condition after accounting for symmetry. This equation can be written as
(33) Equation (33) indicates that price is greater that marginal cost as long as the right hand side of the equation is strictly positive. Since we only consider an interior solution, then b q > 0 and the entire right hand side is strictly positive only when (n 1 + n 2 ¡ 1) v + 1 > 0, or equivalently when v > ¡1 (n 1 +n 2 ¡1) . Further, since n 1 ; n 21 , we have ¡1 (n1+n2¡1) < 1. Therefore, we have established that price is greater than marginal cost for any v 2 ³
A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
To prove corollary 1, we show that any resulting markup when v 2 (0; v] is greater than the markup in the Cournot equilibrium, while any resulting markup when v 2 [v; 0) is less than the markup in the Cournot equilibrium. Let the markup associated with each v be denoted by b P v ¡ c 1 . Since lemma 1 establishes that the model yields the Cournot equilibrium when v = 0, then the markup in the Cournot equilibrium is denote as b P 0 ¡c 1 . From equation (33), we can see that b P ¡ c 1 is continuous and monotonically increasing in v since n 1 ; n 2¸1 , that is,
> 0. Therefore, by de…nition of an increasing function, we must have
A.3 Proof of Remark 1
Recall that M 1 = (n1+n2¡1)v+1 n 1
; and M 2 = (n1+n2¡1)v+1 n 2
. Given that the numerators are identical, it is easy to see that M 2 > M 1 as long as n 1 > n 2 .
We prove the remaining portion of the remark by contradiction. Suppose M 1 · 0: This implies that 
Thus, following arguments analogous to the ones made in comparing home and foreign …rms outputs across regimes above, it is easy to see that e Q > b Q if v > 0, and e Q < b Q if v < 0.
In the case of price, it can be shown that
Thus, it is easy to see that, e P < b P if v > 0, and e P > b P if v < 0. Q.E.D.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i) of the proposition is straight forward since equations (28) and (29) are identical when v = 0. We now consider part (ii) of the proposition. First, from remark 1 we know that n 1 > n 2 implies that M 2 > M 1 . Suppose (c 1 ¡ c 2 ) > 
. Using this inequality jointly with the expressions for e t ¤ and b t ¤ , we can see that e t ¤ < b t ¤ . Q.E.D. 
A.7 Derivation of Optimal Tari¤ under Each Regime

